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                                                                         Abstract
A common mechanism to elicit risk preferences requires a respondent to make a series 
of dichotomous choices. A recurring problem with this mechanism is a frequently 
observed tendency to switch from the less to the more risky choice multiple times, 
multiple switching behaviour. We introduce an instructional variation which our 
evidence suggests practically eliminates such behaviour. We read a script emphasizing 
only one decision will determine earnings before providing written instructions. 
Emphasizing the incentive compatibility of the payment rule reduces observed multiple 
switching behaviour from 13.3% to 2.3% in one format and from 25.8% to 6.7% in 
another.
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INTRODUCTION 
In many cases, the predictions of economic theory 
depend on the risk preference of the decision-maker. 
To address this issue, experimental economists have 
investigated several approaches to elicit preferences 
for risk. The most common approach, a Multiple 
Price List (MPL), requires respondents to make a 
series of dichotomous choices between two lotteries 
or a lottery and a guaranteed payoff. In such mechanisms, 
the expected lottery payout is increased as the 
respondent proceeds through the series so as to induce 
the respondent to switch from the less risky to the 
more risky choice. The decision at which the respondent 
switches produces an interval estimate of the 
respondent’s risk preference. 
Frequently a nontrivial number of respondents 
switch multiple times, exhibiting Multiple Switching 
Behaviour (MSB). MSB is problematic because of 
the inconsistency with economic theory. This article 
provides evidence to suggest that MSB is due, in 
large part, to the lack of salience. An instructional 
variation intended to emphasize the incentive 
compatibility of the payment rule in such mechanisms 
is shown to reduce observed MSB from 13.3% to 
2.3% in one format and from 25.8% to 6.7% in 
another. 
Recently, several studies have employed an MPL 
risk elicitation mechanism (Holt and Laury, 2002; 
Goeree et al., 2003; Eckel and Wilson, 2004; 
Andersen et al., 2006; Bruner et al., 2007). All of these 
studies report a concerning proportion of subjects that 
exhibitMSB.Holt and Laury (2002) reported 13.2%of 
their subjects exhibit MSB, which drops to 5.5% when 
their payoffs are scaled by a factor of 50 or 90. Eckel 
and Wilson (2004) reported 12.9% of their subjects 
exhibit MSB. Bruner et al. (2007) reported 20% of 
their subjects exhibit MSB. Most recently, Andersen 
et al. (2006) reported that they observe 5.8% MSB 
when they include an indifference option in the 
mechanism, which 24.3% of their subjects used.1 
Rationally, there is no reason for the subjects to exhibit 
such behaviour because each subsequent lottery dominates 
the previous. Furthermore, such responses prevent 
the estimation of risk preference and reduce the 
legitimacy of the elicitation mechanism. As such, determining 
and correcting for the cause of this behaviour is 
essential to the validity of the MPL risk preference 
elicitation. This article presents evidence gleaned from 
the laboratory that such behaviour is symptomatic of 
the lack of salience, which can be corrected with a 
simple instructional variation. 
 
 
II. EXPERIMENT 
 
We compare data from control sessions to treatment 
sessions of our experiment. Both sets of sessions implement 
identical mechanisms to elicit individual risk preferences. 
The mechanism presents respondents with 10 
decisions requiring a choice between a lottery and a 
guaranteed $5. Subjects are presented with two formats 
of the mechanism. In the Probability Variation (PV) 
format, the outcomes of the lottery are held constant, 
$0 and $10, although the probability of winning the 
high payoff varies from 0.10 to 1.0 in increments of 0.10 
(see Table 1). In the Reward Variation (RV) format, 
the probability of a payout is held constant, 0.50, 
although the amount of the payout is varied from 
$2.00 to $20.00 in $2.00 increments. The other outcome 
to the lottery is held constant at 0 as in the PV format. 
All subjects completed both the PV and the RV format. 
The principle difference between the two sets of sessions 
is an instructional variation, the treatment variable. 
2 In the treatment sessions, subjects were read aloud 
instructions from a script intended to reinforce the incentive 
compatibility of the payment rule; only one decision 
would be chosen to determine a subject’s earnings.3 
Specifically, before any instructions being displayed on 
the computer screen, subjects were read a script intended 
to emphasize the incentive compatibility of the payment 
rule.4 After listening to the verbal instructions, subjects 
proceeded through written instructions on their computer 
screens. Subjects in the control sessions proceeded 
directly to the written instructions. After reading the 
instructions, subjects entered their 10 decisions into the 
computer. Subjects were informed of their earnings 
upon completion of the experiment. 
 
The subject pool consists of volunteer students. 
Subjects were recruited by e-mail via the lab’s Online 
Recruitment System for Experimental Economics 
(ORSEE) (Greiner, 2004). The experiment was programmed 
and conducted with the software Z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). Experimental sessions lasted for 
approximately 35 minutes. Average earnings were $12 
including a $5 show-up fee. 
 
 
 
 
 
III. RESULTS 
 
We make comparisons across the baseline and treatment 
sessions for both formats.We construct a dummy 
variable to indicate MSB. Table 2 summarizes the pro- 
portion of subjects that exhibitMSB across the two sets 
of sessions and the two formats. 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice that there is a large reduction in the proportion 
of MSB from the baseline to the treatment sessions 
for both formats. Additionally, there is a large 
reduction in the proportion of MSB from the RV to 
the PV format within a given set of sessions. We formally 
test the equivalence of these proportions. The 
baseline sessions are denoted by 0 and the treatment 
sessions denoted by 1. Table 3 presents the results 
from the formal tests of differences in proportions. 
 
 
 
 
The hypothesis tests indicate that there is a statistically 
significant reduction in MSB by including the 
verbal instruction to subjects. The hypothesis tests 
fail to reject the null of no difference in proportions 
across formats within the sets of sessions. These results 
are supported by the probit estimation of MSB in 
Table 4. The probit estimation controls for possible 
order, format and instructional effects with dummy 
variables. The only significant coefficient is on the 
dummy variable for the treatment sessions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The prevalence of MSB in the literature has been 
problematic for MPL mechanisms that elicit preferences 
for risk. The fact that we observe such a dramatic 
decrease in the proportion of MSB upon 
implementing the verbal instruction intended to reinforce 
the incentive compatibility of the payment rule 
suggests that MSB is a symptom of failure to induce 
values (Smith, 1982). In particular, MSB appears to be 
the result of the lack of salience. Holt and Laury 
(2002) demonstrated a reduction in MSB when their 
payoffs were dramatically increased. However, this is 
a rather expensive means of increasing salience. We 
demonstrate that this same level of salience can be 
achieved through verbal instruction in addition to 
written instructions. This offers a less expensive avenue 
of increasing salience to the experimentalist on a 
budget. 
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NOTES 
 
1 Goeree et al. (2003) only reported that 6.0% of their subjects exhibit an identical pattern of 
inconsistent responses. 
 
2 Another difference between the two sets of sessions is the decision task separating the two 
formats. In the control sessions, subjects were asked their willingness-to-accept for the lottery in 
the PV format. However, this task was replaced in the treatment sessions by a task that 
required subjects to choose between the lottery in the PV format and the lottery in the RV 
format. We control for any possible influence this may have had on subject responses in the 
analysis. 
 
3 The selection of the each subject’s decision that determined their payoff was presented as a 
compound lottery; the computer first selected the stage of the experiment (each had 1/3 chance 
of being selected) and then the decision of the selected stage was chosen (each had a 1/10 
chance of being selected). Thus, we assume that preferences conform to the Independence 
Axiom (Samuelson, 1952). The evidence in the literature suggests that ‘random lottery selection’ 
is incentive-compatible for simple choice sets (Starmer and Sugden, 1991; Wilcox, 1993; 
Ballinger and Wilcox, 1997). 
 
4 The following script was read aloud to subjects. ‘Before we begin with the instructions, I would 
like to bring one thing to your attention. As you will read in the instructions, you are going to 
make several decisions in this experiment. However, only ONE of these will actually determine 
your earnings for this experiment! So, it is important that you take each decision seriously since 
a single mistake can be quite costly!’ 
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